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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper begins by proposing two cardinal measures of inequality in life chances as well as an 
ordinal representation of such inequality based on the use of so-called social immobility curves. 
Using as its database a matrix in which the lines correspond to the social category of parents (e.g., 
their occupation or educational level) and the columns to the income distribution of their 
children, it then highlights the importance of the marginal distributions when comparing social 
immobility within two populations, and shows how it is possible to neutralize differences in these 
margins. The idea is to adapt a method used in the field of occupational segregation measurement 
that allows one to make a distinction between differences in gross and net social immobility, 
assuming that the marginal distributions of the two populations are identical. Borrowing ideas 
from recent literature on the equality of opportunity, the paper then defines the concept of an 
inequality in circumstances curve and relates it to that of a social immobility curve. 
Two empirical datasets are used to determine the usefulness of the concepts presented. 
The first dataset comes from a survey conducted in France in 1998 and allows one to measure the 
degree of social immobility and of inequality in circumstances on the basis of the occupation of 
fathers or mothers and the income class to which sons or daughters belong. The second dataset, 
drawn from a social survey conducted in Israel in 2003, is the basis for a study of social 
immobility and inequality in circumstances, emphasizing the transition from the educational level 
of the fathers to the income class of the children. Both illustrations confirm the usefulness of the 
analytical tools described in this paper.  
 
Keywords: Equality of Opportunity, France, Inequality in Circumstances, Inequality in Life 
Chances, Israel, Social Mobility 
 
JEL Classifications: D31, D63, I31, J62  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The topic of intergenerational mobility measurement has been increasingly popular among 
economists in recent years (for interesting surveys see, for example, Solon 1999; Corak, 
Gustafsson, and Österberg 2004). In a recent paper, Van de gaer, Schokkaert, and Martinez 
(2001) have made a distinction between three meanings of intergenerational mobility, stressing, 
respectively, the idea of movement, the inequality of opportunity, and the inequality of life 
chances.  
  When mobility is viewed as movement, the goal is usually to measure the degree to which 
the position of children is different from that of their parents. Those adopting such an approach 
tend to work with transition matrices whose typical element pij refers to the probability that a 
child has position j, given that his/her parents had position i. These matrices are square matrices 
and it should be clear that mobility in this sense will be higher the smaller the value of the 
probabilities pii.     
  The second approach to mobility attempts to measure the degree to which the income 
prospects of children are equalized, that is, they do not depend on the social origin of the parents. 
What is often done in such types of analyses when comparing, for example, two groups of parents 
(e.g., two educational levels or two occupations) is to check whether the distribution of the 
outcomes (incomes) of the children of one group of parents stochastically dominates the 
distribution of the second category of parents (see, for example, Peragine 2004; Lefranc, 
Pistolesi, and Trannoy 2006). 
  The third approach emphasizes the concept of inequality of life chances so that “the only 
thing that matters here is that children get equal lotteries. The prizes do not matter.” (Van de gaer, 
Schokkaert, and Martinez 2001). Such an approach is particularly relevant when one analyzes the 
movement between socioeconomic categories which cannot always be ranked in order of 
importance. 
  In the present paper we focus most of our attention on the third approach and first propose 
two cardinal measures of social immobility (inequality in life chances) that do not require the 
matrix to be analyzed to be a square matrix. This allows us, for example, to study the transition 
from the original social category (educational level or occupation) of the parents to the income 
class to which the children belong. But these measures could also be applied to an analysis of the 
transition from one type of social category (e.g., educational level of the parents) to another type 
of social category (profession of the children), assuming there is no specific ordering of these   3
categories. We also propose an ordinal representation of this approach, based on the use of what 
we have called “social immobility curves.”  
  In the second stage of the analysis we stress the importance of the marginal distributions 
when comparing social immobility in two populations. What we want to emphasize is that it 
makes sense to neutralize the differences between the two populations concerned in the 
distribution of the parents by social category (e.g., occupation or educational level) and the 
income distribution of the children. More specifically, we suggest borrowing a method that has 
been used in the field of occupational segregation measurement to make a distinction, when 
comparing two populations, between differences in gross and net social immobility, the latter 
concept assuming that the marginal distributions of the two populations compared are identical.  
  In a third stage, borrowing some ideas of the recent literature on the equality of 
opportunity (e.g., Roemer 1998; Kolm 2001; Ruiz-Castillo 2003; Villar 2005), we define the 
concept of inequality in the circumstances curve and relate it to the social immobility curve 
previously presented. 
  Two empirical illustrations then attempt to illustrate the usefulness of the concepts 
previously defined. The first set of data comes from a survey conducted in France in 1998 and 
allows us to measure the degree of social immobility and inequality in circumstances on the basis 
of information on the occupation of fathers or mothers and of the income class to which sons or 
daughters belong. Using a second set of data, based on a social survey conducted in Israel in 
2003, we then measure social immobility and inequality in circumstances by studying the 
transition from the educational level of the fathers to the income class to which the children 
belong. Both illustrations seem to confirm the usefulness of the tools of analysis described in this 
paper. Concluding comments are given at the end of the paper.   
 
2. MEASURING SOCIAL IMMOBILITY 
2.A. Cardinal Measures of Social Mobility 
2.A.1. Defining Two Indices of Social Immobility 
Let us assume a data matrix (M) whose lines (i) correspond to the social origin of the individuals 
(e.g., occupation of the father or mother, or educational level of the father or mother) and whose 
columns (j) correspond to the income brackets to which these individuals belong. For example, 
Mij would give the number of individuals whose income belongs to the income bracket j and 
whose father had educational level i.  
 Define  now  mij as mij = Mij / (∑i=1 to I ∑j=1 to J Mij ), mi. as mi. = (∑j=1 to J mij), and m.j as 
m.j = (∑i=1 to I mij).   4
  Perfect social mobility may be assumed to exist when the probability that an individual 
belongs to a specific income bracket (k) is independent of his social origin (h) (e.g., educational 
level of his father). In other words, in such a case we could write that mhk = (mh. m.k ). As a 
consequence, any index measuring the degree of independence between the lines and the columns 
of such a matrix could be selected as a measure of social mobility.  
  A first measure one may think of is an entropy related index such as one of Theil’s (1967) 
famous indices which amount somehow to comparing “prior probabilities” with “posterior 
probabilities.” In our case the “prior probabilities” would be the products mh. m.k , while the 
“posterior probabilities” would be the proportions mhk. Such a formulation of the Theil index 
would be 
 
                   Tsim =  ∑i=1 to I ∑j=1 to J {(mi. m.j ) ln [(mi. m.j )/mij]}                            (1) 
 
  The subscript “sim” in Tsim in (1) indicates that such an index would, in fact, be a “social 
immobility index” because it would be equal to 0 when there is perfect independence between the 
social origins and the income brackets.  
  Another possibility is to use a Gini-related index, as suggested originally by Flückiger and 
Silber (1994). As stressed also by Silber (1989a), the Gini index may be also used to measure the 
degree of dissimilarity between a set of “prior probabilities” and a set of “posterior probabilities.” 
In the case of inequality measurement, the “prior probabilities” are the population shares and the 
“posterior probabilities” the income shares, while when measuring occupational segregation by 
gender, the “prior probabilities” are, for example, the shares of male workers employed in the 
various occupations and the “posterior probabilities” the corresponding shares of female workers 
(or the reverse). 
  Such a Gini-related index of social (im)mobility may be expressed as 
 
                     Gsim = […(mi. m.j )…]´ G […mij...]                                     (2) 
 
where […(mi. m.j )…]´ is a row vector giving the “prior probabilities” corresponding to the 
various (I×J) cells (i,j), while […..mij….] is a column vector giving the “posterior probabilities” 
(the actual probabilities) for these cells. Note that, as indicated in Silber (1989a), the elements of 
these row and column vectors have both to be ranked by decreasing ratios (mij)/(mi. m.j ). The   5
operator G in (2), called G-matrix (see Silber 1989b), is a (I×J) by (I×J) square matrix whose 
typical element gpq is equal to 0 if p=q, to -1 if p>q, and to +1 if p<q. 
  Note that the index Gsim is also a social immobility index because it will be equal to zero 
when all “prior probabilities” (mi. m.j) are equal to the “posterior probabilities” mij and in such a 
case we would have perfect mobility. However, since the Gini index is bounded by 0 and 1, we 
can define a social mobility index Gsm as  
 
                                         Gsm = 1- Gsim                                                                 (3) 
 
2.A.2. Properties of the Social Mobility Indices 
2.A.2.a. The Theil social immobility index   
2.A.2.a.1. Value of the index when there is perfect immobility.  We know that when there is 
perfect mobility mij= (mi. m.j) ∀i and ∀j, so that Tsim will be equal to zero. 
 
2.A.2.a.2. Impact of two “margin-preserving” transfers.  In Appendix A we prove that if 
(mfh/(mf.m.h))>(mfk/(mf.m.k)) and (mlk/(ml.m.k))>(mlh/(ml.m.h)) and if two “transfers” of size δ take 
place, one from mfh to mfk and one from mlk to mlh, so that the combination of these two transfers 
implies that there was no change in the marginal shares, the value of the Theil index of 
immobility will decrease. 
2.A.2.b. The Gini social immobility index 
2.A.2.b.1. Value of the index when there is perfect immobility  We know that when there is 
perfect mobility mij= (mi. m.j) ∀i and ∀j. Given the definition of the G-matrix given previously, it 
is easy to see that in such a case the Gini immobility index Gsim will be equal to zero. 
 
2.A.2.b.2. Impact of two “margin-preserving” transfers  Assume we order the products (mi. m.j) 
of the elements (mi.) and (m.j) by increasing values of the ratios (mij/(mi. m.j)). Let us similarly 
order the shares (mij) by increasing values of the ratios (mij/(mi. m.j)). We now plot the cumulative 
values of the elements (mi. m.j) on the horizontal axis and the cumulative values of the shares 
(mij) on the vertical axis. The curve obtained will be called a “social immobility curve.” It is, in 
fact, what is known in the literature as a relative concentration curve and clearly its slope is 
nondecreasing.  
  In the specific case when mij= (mi. m.j ) ∀i and ∀j, this curve will become the diagonal line 
going from (0,0) to (1,1).    6
  Assume now that (mfh/(mf.m.h))>(mfk/(mf.m.k)) and that (mlk/(ml.m.k))>(mlh/(ml.m.h)). 
Assume also that two “transfers” of size δ take place, one from mfh to mfk and one from mlk to mlh, 
so that the combination of these two transfers implies that there was no change in the marginal 
shares. It should be clear that in such a case the curve we have just defined will get closer to the 
diagonal line so that the area between this curve and the diagonal will become smaller. However, 
since the definition of the Gini social immobility index  Gsim in (2) was a simple extension of the 
traditional definition of the Gini income inequality index (see Silber 1989b) to the case of social 
immobility measurement and since, in the former case, we know that the Gini index is equal to 
twice the area lying between the diagonal and the Lorenz curve, we can conclude that when the 
area lying between a “social immobility curve” and the diagonal decreases, the value of the social 
immobility index Gsim will decrease. Therefore, the sum of two “progressive margin preserving 
transfers” leads to a decrease in the value of the Gini immobility index Gsim. 
 
2.B. An Ordinal Approach to Measuring Social Immobility: Drawing “Social Immobility 
Curves” 
We can first draw “Social Immobility Curves” as they have been defined previously in Section 
2.A.2.b.2. Using results that have appeared in the income inequality literature we can conclude, 
when comparing social immobility in two populations, if in subpopulation A the “social 
immobility curve” lies nowhere below but at times lies above that corresponding to 
subpopulation B, social immobility in subpopulation A is smaller than that in subpopulation B. 
 
3. COMPARING TWO SOCIAL MOBILITY MATRICES 
 
Assume now that we want to compare two social mobility matrices {mij} and {vij}. Such matrices 
may refer to two different periods or to two population subgroups at a given time, such as ethnic 
groups, regions, etc. On the basis of each of these two matrices we could compute social 
immobility indices such as those defined in expressions (1) and (2), and conclude in which case 
social immobility is higher. This may, however, be too hasty a way to draw firm conclusions, as 
will now be shown. 
  Assume the social mobility matrices {mij} and {vij} correspond to two different time 
periods. The point is that social mobility may vary over time for various reasons. First, there may 
have been a change in the distribution of parents by social origin. Second, there may have been a 
change in the income distribution of the children. These two possibilities correspond evidently to   7
a variation in one of the margins of the social mobility matrix. There may, however, be a third 
reason for a variation in the degree of social mobility. Even if there was no change over time in 
the margins of the social mobility matrix, there may have been a change in the degree of 
independence between the rows (social origin of the parents) and columns (shares of various 
income brackets) of this matrix. This distinction between the impact of a change in the margins of 
a matrix and a change in the “internal structure” of this matrix [this is the terminology used by 
Karmel and MacLachlan (1988) when they refer to the degree of independence between the lines 
and columns of a matrix] was pointed out by Karmel and MacLachlan (1988) in the framework of 
an analysis of changes over time in occupational segregation by gender.  
  The purpose of this section is to show that it is possible to apply the methodology 
proposed by Karmel and Maclachlan (1988) when analyzing changes over time in the degree 
social mobility (or when comparing the degree of social mobility of two population subgroups). 
Such a methodology uses an algorithm originally proposed by Deming and Stephan (1940). In 
addition, it will be shown [as was already stressed by Deutsch, Flückiger, and Silber (2006) in the 
framework of occupational segregation analysis] that it is possible to generalize this methodology 
by applying also the concept of Shapley decomposition (see Chantreuil and Trannoy 1999; 
Shorrocks 1999; Sastre and Trannoy 2002). A simple presentation of this approach is given in 
Appendix B. As far as its application to social mobility analysis is concerned, we will be able to 
derive (see, Appendix C for the exact demonstration) the specific contributions to the overall 
variation in the extent of social immobility of changes in the income distribution of the 
individuals (the children) and in the distribution of the parents by social category (these two 
changes correspond to variations in the margins of the social mobility matrix), as well as in the 
“pure” variation in the extent of social immobility (changes in the degree of independence 
between the lines and columns of the social mobility matrix itself).  
 
3.A. Neutralizing the Specific Impacts of Changes in the Margins of the Social Mobility 
Matrix 
The methodology to be used to isolate the specific effects of changes in the margins is borrowed 
from the literature on the measurement of occupational segregation (see Karmel and McLachlan 
1988) and is extended here to the measurement of variations in the extent of social mobility. 
As stated previously, assume that the population under scrutiny is divided into I categories of 
social origin and J income brackets. We can now define a matrix {qij } in such a way that its 
typical element (qij) is equal to the product (mi. m.j ) of the margins i and j of the matrix {mij }.   8
Clearly if mij is equal to qij for all i and j, there is independence between the social origin (the 
lines of the matrix {mij} ) and the income of the individuals (the columns of the matrix {mij } ). If 
mij  is not equal to qij for at least some i and j, the rows and the columns are at least partially 
dependent and such a link between the income of an individual and his/her social origin should 
help us measure the extent of social immobility.  
  Let us now assume that we wish to decompose the variation over time in the extent of 
social mobility. In order to do so we will adopt a technique originally proposed by Deming and 
Stephan (1940) and used by Karmel and McLachlan (1988). The idea, when comparing two 
matrices of proportions {mij} and {vij}, is to build a third matrix {sij} which would have, for 
example, the internal structure of the matrix {mij} but the margins of the matrix {vij}. To derive 
{sij}, one multiplies first all the cells (i,j) of {mij} by the ratios (vi./mi.) where vi. and mi. are, 
respectively, the horizontal margins of the matrices {vij} and {mij}. Call {rij} the matrix you 
derived after such a multiplication. Multiply now all the cells (i,j) of this matrix {rij}by the ratios 
(v.j/r.j) where v.j and r.j are now the vertical margins of the matrices {vij}and {rij}. Call {uij} the 
new matrix you just derived. If you renew this procedure several times, the matrix you derive will 
quickly converge, as shown by Deming and Stephan (1940), to a matrix {sij} that has the margins 
of the matrix {vij} but, in a way, the internal structure of the matrix {mij}. In other words, the 
degree of social immobility corresponding to the matrix {sij} is identical to that corresponding to 
the original matrix {mij}, but the matrix {sij} has the same “income distribution of the 
individuals” and the same “structure of the social origin of these individuals” as that of the matrix 
{vij}. One could naturally have proceeded in the reverse order by starting with the matrix {vij} 
and ending up with a matrix {wij} that would have the margins of the matrix {mij}, but the 
internal structure of the matrix {vij}. 
 
3.B. Decomposing Variations Over Time in the Extent of Social Mobility 
In the previous section we have shown how the “move” from the matrix {mij} to the matrix {vij} 
included really two stages: one in which the margins were changed and one in which the internal 
structure of the matrix was modified. Let ∆SIM = SIM(v) – SIM(m) refer to the overall variation 
in the extent of social immobility. In Appendix C we first show, using the concept of Shapley 
decomposition (see Chantreuil and Trannoy 1999; Shorrocks 1999; Sastre and Trannoy 2002), 
that ∆SIM may be expressed as the sum of a contribution C∆ma of differences in the margins and a 
contribution C∆is of differences in the internal structure of the two social mobility matrices 
compared.    9
  Then, applying the idea of a Nested Shapley decomposition (see Sastre and Trannoy 
2002), we show that it is possible to further decompose the contribution C∆ma of the margins. 
More precisely, we show that this latter contribution C∆ma may itself be broken down into the sum 
of the contributions Ch and Ct of the horizontal and vertical margins.                                                                      
 
4. MEASURES OF SOCIAL IMMOBILITY VERSUS MEASURES OF INEQUALITY IN 
CIRCUMSTANCES 
 
 Given that the case we are studying is that where the lines of the matrix to be analyzed 
correspond to “social origin” categories (e.g., occupation or educational level of the parents) and 
the columns to income classes (to which the “sons” or “daughters” belong), one may want to 
adopt the terminology used in the literature related to the measurement of equality of opportunity 
and call the lines “types” or “circumstances.” Under certain conditions one may want to call the 
columns “levels of effort,” although such an extension implies quite strong assumptions 
concerning the link between income and effort.  
  In any case, we will limit ourselves to attempting to derive a measure of inequality in 
circumstances. Adopting Kolm’s (2001) ideas, we may define the inequality in circumstances as 
the weighted average of the inequalities within each “income class” (“effort level”), the weights 
being the population shares of the various income classes. We cannot, however, measure 
inequality the way Kolm (2001) suggested by comparing the average level of income for a given 
level of effort with what he calls the “equal equivalent” level of income for this same level of 
effort. We can, however, measure inequality within a given income class (“effort level”) by 
comparing the distribution of the “actual shares” (mij/m.j) for each income class (j) with what 
could be considered as the “expected shares” (mi/1)= mi..  
  Using one of Theil’s inequality measures this leads to the following measure of inequality 
within income class j: 
                             Tj =  ∑i=1 to I {(mi.) ln [(mi.)/(mij/m.j)]}                           (4) 
 
The Theil measure of overall inequality in circumstances Tcirc would then be defined as  
        Tcirc = ∑j=1 to J (m.j) Tj = ∑j=1 to J (m.j)  ∑i=1 to I {(mi.) ln [(mi.)/(mij/m.j)]} 
↔ Tcirc =  ∑j=1 to J  ∑i=1 to I {(m.j) (mi.) ln [(mi.)/(mij/m.j)]} 
                ↔ Tcirc =  ∑j=1 to J  ∑i=1 to I {(mi.) (m.j) ln [(mi.)(m.j)/(mij)]}          (5) 
   10
which is, in fact, identical to the measure Tim of social immobility suggested in (1). 
  Let us now measure inequality in circumstances on the basis of the Gini index. Here again 
we will measure inequality within a given income class (“effort level”) by comparing the 
distribution of the “actual shares” (mij/m.j) for each income class (j) with what could be 
considered as the “expected shares” (mi/1)= mi.. Using the Gini-matrix which was defined in (2) 
we derive the following measure of inequality within income class (“effort level”) j: 
 
            Gj = […(mi.)…]´ G […(mij/m.j)...]                                                     (6) 
            ↔ Gj = (1/m.j) […(mi.)…]´ G […(mij)...]                                           (7) 
 
where the two vectors (of length I) on both sides of the G-matrix in (6) and (7) are ranked by 
decreasing values of the ratios (mij/m.j)/(mi.), that is, by decreasing values of the ratios (mij)/(mi.).  
To derive an overall Gini index of inequality of circumstances (Gcirc) we will have to weight the 
indices given in (7) by the weights of the income classes j. We should however remember that in 
defining such an overall within groups Gini inequality index the sum of the weights will not be 
equal to 1 because each weight will in fact be equal to (m.j)
2 in the same way as in the traditional 
within groups Gini  index the weights are equal to the product of the population and income 
shares. We therefore end up with 
 
Gcirc =  ∑j=1 to J (m.j)
2 (1/m.j) […(mi.)…]´ G […(mij)...] 
↔  Gcirc =  ∑j=1 to J (m.j) […(mi.)…]´ G […(mij)...] 
                     ↔  Gcirc =  ∑j=1 to J […,(mi.)(m.j), …]´ G […(mij)...]                (8) 
 
  Note that the formulation for Gcirc in (8) is not identical to that of Gsim in (2). To see the 
difference between these two formulations, the following graphical interpretation may be given. 
As was done when drawing a social immobility curve, put respectively on the horizontal and 
vertical axes the expected shares (mi.) and the actual shares (mij), starting with income class 1 and 
ranking both sets of shares by increasing ratios (mij)/(mi.). Then do the same for income class 2 
and continue with the other classes until you end up with income class I. What we have then 
obtained is a curve which could be called an “inequality in circumstances” curve which 
comprises I sections, one for each income class. Clearly the slope of this curve is not always 
nondecreasing. It is nondecreasing within each income class but the curve reaches the diagonal 
each time we end with an income class.   11
  We should however note that the shares used to draw such an “inequality in circumstances 
curve” are the same as that used in constructing a social immobility curve [compare both sides of 
the G-matrix in (2) and (8)]. In drawing the curve measuring inequality in circumstances we have 
simply “reshuffled” the sets of shares used in drawing a social immobility curve. Rather than 
ranking both sets of shares [on one hand the cumulative shares ((mi.)(m.j)), the cumulative shares 
(mij) on the other hand] by increasing values of the ratios (mij)/((mi.)(m.j)) working with all the I 
by J shares, we have first collected the shares corresponding to the first (poorest) income class 
and ranked them by increasing ratios (mi1)/((mi.)(m.1)), and then did the same successively for all 
income classes.  
  An illustration of the difference between an “inequality in circumstances” curve and a 
social immobility curve is given in Figure 1 which will be analyzed in the empirical section. Note 
that whereas the index Gcirc is equal to twice the area lying between the “inequality in 
circumstances” curve and the diagonal, the index Gsim is equal to twice the area lying between the 
social immobility curve and the diagonal. The area lying between the inequality in circumstances 
curve and the social immobility curve may then be considered as a measure of the degree of 
overlap between the various income classes in terms of the gaps between the “expected” and 
“actual” shares.                                                                                  
 
5. THE EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 
5.A. The Data Sources  
We have analyzed two sets of data. The first set is a survey of 2000 individuals conducted in 
France by Thomas Piketty in the year 1998 with financial support from the McArthur Foundation 
(see Piketty 1999). The data set contains 65 variables and includes income, many 
sociodemographic characteristics, and answers to questions on social, political, ethical, and 
cultural issues. 
  Two types of variables were drawn from this database. To measure the social origin of the 
parents we used information on the profession of either the father or the mother. Eight 
professions were distinguished:  
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    1)  farmer (i.e., head of agricultural enterprise) 
    2)  businessman, store owner, or “artisan” 
    3)  manager or independent professional 
    4)  technician or middle-rank manager 
  5)    employee 
    6)  blue collar worker, including salaried persons working in agriculture 
    7)  not working outside the household 
  8)    retired 
 
The social status of the children’s generation was measured via their monthly income classified in 
eight categories: 
    1)  less than 4,000 FF 
    2)  from 4,000FF to 5,999FF 
    3)  from 6,000FF to 7,999FF 
    4)  from 8,000FF to 9,999FF 
    5)  from 10,000FF to 11,999FF 
    6)  from 12,000FF to 14,999FF 
    7)  from 15,000FF to 19,999FF 
    8)  20,000FF or more 
 
  On the basis of these two variables we built a social mobility matrix {mij} whose lines (i) 
refer to the profession of either the father or the mother, depending on the case, and whose 
columns (j) correspond to the income group to which the individual (the child, either the son or 
the daughter, depending on the case examined) belongs. In other words, mij represents the share 
in the total population of those who belong to income group j and whose parents had profession i. 
  The second data set we worked with was the Social Survey that was conducted in Israel in 
2003. The social origin of the individual was measured via the highest educational certificate or 
degree the father of the individual had received. Seven educational categories were distinguished: 
 
    1)  Elementary school completion  
    2)  Secondary school completion, but not a baccalaureate  
    3)  Baccalaureate certificate   
    4)  Post-secondary, nonacademic certificate    
    5)  BA, academic certificate, or similar certificate    
    6)  MA, MD, or similar certificate   
    7)  PhD or similar diploma 
 
The status of the children was measured via the total gross income of all members of the 
household to which the individual belonged, whatever the source of the income (work, pensions, 
support payments, rents, etc.). Ten income classes were distinguished: 
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    1)  NIS 2,000 or less
1 
    2)  NIS 2,001–3,000 
    3)  NIS 3,001–4,000 
    4)  NIS 4,001–5,000 
    5)  NIS 5,001–7,000 
    6)  NIS 7,001–9,000 
    7)  NIS 9,001–12,000 
    8)  NIS 12,001–15,000 
    9)  NIS 15,001–20,000 
    10) More than NIS 20,000 
 
  On the basis of these two variables we built a social mobility matrix {mij} whose lines (i) 
refer to the educational level of the father and whose columns (j) correspond to the income group 
to which the individual (the child) belongs. In other words mij represents the share in the total 
population of those who belong to income group j and whose fathers had educational level i. 
  We then analyzed differences in the degree of social mobility between three groups: the 
individuals whose father was born in Asia or Africa, those whose father was born in Europe or 
America, and those whose father was born in Israel. 
 
5.B. The Results of the Empirical Investigation 
5.B.1. Measuring Social Immobility 
5.B.1.a. The French data  The results of the analysis are reported in Table 1 which examines 
six different comparisons. In each comparison we give the value of the Gini social immobility 
index and decompose the difference between the values taken by this index in two different cases 
into the three components mentioned previously. For each index and component we also give 
confidence intervals based on a bootstrap analysis (see Appendix D for more details on this 
procedure). It is easy to observe that in all six tables (1-A to 1-F) the two Gini indices of social 
immobility which are compared are always significantly different one from the other. Moreover 
each of the components in all the six tables is always significantly different from zero. 
  The first striking result is that the degree of social immobility is quite higher when 
comparing fathers and sons (Gini social immobility index equal to 0.202) or fathers to daughters 
(Gini index equal to 0.193) than when comparing mothers to sons (Gini index equal to 0.143) or 
even mothers to daughters (Gini index equal to 0.166). We also observe when comparing, for 
example, the degree of social immobility from fathers to sons with that from mothers to sons that 
the difference (lower degree of social immobility in the latter case) is even much higher once we 
control for the margins. In other words, the difference in the degree of “net social immobility” is, 
                                                 
1 NIS stands for New Israeli Shekels.   14
in this case, much higher (0.140 rather than 0.049 for the difference in “gross social immobility”). 
Note also that this impact of the margins is usually mainly one which is related to differences in 
the occupational structure of the parents.  
  In Figure 1 we have drawn the “Gross Social Immobility Curve” for the case where the 
transition analyzed is that from father’s occupation to daughter’s income. The second curve in 
Figure 1 will be analyzed in Section 5.B.2.a.  
 
5.B.1.b. The Israeli data  The results of the analysis are presented in Table 2, again with 
bootstrap confidence intervals. Note that here also in the three comparisons which are made the 
Gini indices of social immobility that are compared are significantly different from one another 
and each of the components is always significantly different from zero. 
  The most striking result here is certainly the fact that social immobility (mobility) is much 
higher (lower) among those who were born in Asia or Africa (Gini index of 0.233) than among 
those born in Europe or America (Gini index of 0.124), or even among those born in Israel (Gini 
index of 0.147). 
  The results are even more striking when we compare “gross” with “net” immobility using 
the algorithm described in Section 2.A.3. Thus, when looking at the results given in Table 2A we 
observe that whereas the “gross difference” between the Gini indices of social immobility of 
those born in Asia or Africa and those born in Europe or America is equal to 0.110, the “net 
difference” (net of changes in the margins) is equal to 0.310. Note also that this impact of the 
margins is essentially an impact of differences in the education levels of (the fathers of) the two 
groups compared. 
  Quite similar conclusions may be drawn when comparing individuals whose father was 
born in Asia or Africa and individuals whose father was born in Israel (Table 2B).  
  In Figure 2 we compare “Gross” and “Net Social Immobility Curves.” The “Gross” 
curves are drawn for two groups, corresponding respectively to the individuals whose father was 
born in Europe or America (EA) and Asia or Africa (AA). The “Net Social Immobility Curve” 
was drawn on the basis of a matrix which has the margins of the matrix of those born in Europe 
or America, but the “internal structure” of the matrix of those born in Asia or Africa. This 
evidence shows clearly how much bigger the gap in social immobility is when comparing the EA 
and AA groups once we control for the margins.   
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5.B.2. Inequality in Circumstances 
5.B.2.a. The French data  In Table 3 we give two examples of the use of the Theil or Gini 
indices of inequality in circumstances. The first example refers to French data where the data 
analyzed are those relative to the transition from the occupation of the fathers to the income class 
to which the daughters belong (see Table 3A and 3B). First we may note (see Table 3A) that, as 
expected, the sum of the contribution of the various income classes to the overall Theil index of 
inequality in circumstances is indeed equal to this latter index. Second we may note that there is 
some discrepancy between the results in Tables 3A and 3B. Whereas on the basis of the Theil 
index the two income classes where inequality in circumstances is highest are those 
corresponding, respectively, to the income ranges 10,000FF to 11,999FF and 15,000FF to 
19,999FF, the two income classes where inequality in circumstances is highest, according to the 
Gini index of inequality in circumstances, are those corresponding, respectively, to the income 
ranges 4,000FF to 5,999FF and 20,000FF or more. As far as the highest relative contributions of 
the income classes to the overall Theil or Gini indices of inequality in circumstances are 
concerned (remember that the weights of the income classes are not the same for the Theil and 
the Gini index) the results are quite similar. In both cases the highest relative contribution is that 
of the richest income class. The second highest is that of the class with an income range of 
4,000FF to 5,999FF for the Theil index and that of the classes 4,000FF to 5,999FF, as well as 
12,000FF to 14,999FF (the results are almost identical for these two income classes) for the Gini 
index. 
  As mentioned previously we have drawn in Figure 1 the “Gross Social Immobility Curve” 
for the case where the transition analyzed is that from father’s occupation to daughter’s income. 
On this same graph we have plotted what was previously called a “Curve of Inequality in 
Circumstances.” The large area lying between both curves indicates clearly that the gap between 
the “expected” shares (mi. m.j) and the “actual” shares mij is not a function of income, hence the 
great degree of overlapping between the income classes when the ranking is based on the ratio of 
actual over expected shares. 
 
5.B.2.b. The Israeli data  The second illustration is based on Israeli data concerning 
individuals whose father was born in Asia or Africa (see Table 3C). Unfortunately we could not 
compute Theil indices because some of the cells in the data matrix were empty. For the Gini 
index (see, Table 3-C) the two income classes with the highest values of this index are those 
corresponding to the income ranges NIS 3,001 to 4,000 and NIS 4,001 to 5,000. We may also   16
observe that according to the Gini index (see Table 3C), the two income classes that contribute 
most to the overall value of the Gini index of inequality in circumstances are those corresponding 
to the income ranges from NIS 7,001 to 9,000 and 9,001 to 12,000. 
 
6. CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
This paper first suggested new tools of analysis to study intergenerational social immobility. 
More precisely, two indices measuring social immobility were proposed, derived from the Theil 
and Gini indices of inequality, and the concept of “social immobility curve” was introduced. The 
main contribution of this paper is, however, its stress of the need to make a distinction between 
concepts of “gross’ and “net” social immobility and, hence, to emphasize the fact that when 
comparing social immobility in two groups it is probably better to base the comparison on a case 
where the margins of the matrices corresponding to the two groups are the same. In fact, it 
appears that measures of differences between two groups in “gross” versus “net” social 
immobility may sometimes lead to opposite conclusions. Finally, this paper also suggested two 
measures of inequality in circumstances, derived also from the Theil and Gini indices. Whereas 
the Theil index of inequality in circumstances turned out to be identical to the Theil index of 
social immobility, we showed that the Gini index of inequality in circumstances did not measure 
the same thing as the Gini index of social immobility and these differences were indeed 
confirmed by the empirical illustration.      17
TABLE 1. SOCIAL MOBILITY—RESULTS BASED ON THE FRENCH DATA BASE 
 
A. Comparing Social Mobility from Fathers to Daughters with Social Mobility from 
Fathers to Sons, Using the Gini Social Immobility Index 
 
Components of the Difference 














Social immobility from fathers 
to daughters (G1 )  0.20237 0,0047  0,1947  0,2101 
Social immobility from fathers 
to sons (G2 )  0.19261 0,0045  0,1852  0,2000 
Difference (G2  - G1) -  0.00976  0,0002  -0,0101  -0,0094 
“Net” difference in social 
immobility  - 0.00083  0,0000  -0,0009  -0,0008 
Difference due to difference in 
the margins of the social 
mobility matrix 
- 0.00892  0,0002  -0,0093  -0,0086 
Difference due to differences in 
the “professional composition” 
of the fathers’ generation 
- 0.00780  0,0002  -0,0081  -0,0075 
Difference due to differences in 
the income distribution of the 
children (daughters versus sons) 
- 0.00112  0,0000  -0,0012  -0,0011 
 
B. Comparing Social Mobility from Fathers to Daughters with Social Mobility from 
Mothers to Sons, Using the Gini Social Immobility Index 
 
Components of the Difference 














Social immobility from fathers to 
daughters (G1 )  0.20237 0,0047  0,1947  0,2101 
Social immobility from mothers 
to sons (G2 )  0.14332 0,0033  0,1380  0,1487 
Difference (G2  - G1) -  0.05905  0,0014  -0,0613  -0,0568 
“Net” difference in social 
immobility  0.03358 0,0008  0,0323  0,0349 
Difference due to difference in 
the margins of the social 
mobility matrix 
- 0.09263  0,0021  -0,0961  -0,0891 
Difference due to differences in 
the “professional composition” 
of the parents (fathers versus 
mothers) 
- 0.08731  0,0020  -0,0906  -0,0840 
Difference due to differences in 
the income distribution of the 
children (daughters versus sons) 
- 0.00532  0,0001  -0,0055  -0,0051 
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C. Comparing Social Mobility from Fathers to Sons with Social Mobility from Mothers to 
Daughters, Using the Gini Social Immobility Index 
 
Components of the Difference 














Social immobility from fathers to 
sons (G1 )  0.19261 0.0045  0.1853  0.1999 
Social immobility from mothers 
to daughters (G2 )  0.16609 0.0038  0.1598  0.1724 
Difference (G2  - G1) -  0.02652  0.0006  -0.0275  -0.0255 
“Net” difference in social 
immobility  - 0.09566  0.0022  -0.0993  -0.0920 
Difference due to difference in 
the margins of the social 
mobility matrix 
0.06913 0.0016  0.0665  0.0718 
Difference due to differences in 
the “professional composition” 
of the parents (fathers versus 
mothers) 
0.07993 0.0018  0.0769  0.0830 
Difference due to differences in 
the income distribution of the 
children (sons versus daughters) 
- 0.01080  0.0002  -0.0112  -0.0104 
 
D. Comparing Social Mobility from Fathers to Daughters with Social Mobility from 
Mothers to Daughters Using the Gini Social Immobility Index 
 
Components of the Difference 















Social immobility from fathers to 
daughters (G1 )  0.20237 0.0046  0.1947  0.2100 
Social immobility from mothers 
to daughters (G2 )  0.16609 0.0039  0.1598  0.1724 
Difference (G2  - G1)  -  0.03628 0.0008  -0.0377 -0.0349 
“Net” difference in social 
immobility  0.04479 0.0010  0.0431  0.0465 
Difference due to difference in the 
margins of the social mobility 
matrix 
-  0.08107 0.0019  -0.0842 -0.0780 
Difference due to differences in 
the “professional composition” of 
the parents (fathers versus 
mothers) 
-  0.08163 0.0019  -0.0847 -0.0785 
Difference due to differences in 
the income distribution of the 
daughters 
0.00056 0.0000  0.0005  0.0006   19
E. Comparing Social Mobility from Fathers to Sons with Social Mobility from Mothers to 
Sons, Using the Gini Social Immobility Index 
 

















Social immobility from fathers 
to sons (G1 )  0.19261  0.0045 0.1852 0.2001 
Social immobility from mothers 
to sons (G2 )  0.14332  0.0033 0.1379 0.1488 
Difference (G2  - G1) -  0.04929  0.0012  -0.0512  -0.0474 
“Net” difference in social 
immobility  - 0.13980  0.0032  -0.1451  -0.1345 
Difference due to difference in 
the margins of the social 
mobility matrix 
0.09051  0.0021 0.0871 0.0940 
Difference due to differences in 
the “professional composition” 
of the parents (fathers versus 
mothers) 
0.09097  0.0021 0.0875 0.0944 
Difference due to differences in 
the income distribution of the 
sons 
- 0.00046  0.0000  -0.0005  -0.0004 
 
F. Comparing Social Mobility from Mothers to Daughters with Social Mobility from 
Mothers to Sons, Using the Gini Social Immobility Index 
 

















Social immobility from mothers 
to daughters (G1 )  0.16609  0.0039 0.1597 0.1725 
Social immobility from mothers 
to sons (G2 )  0.14332  0.0033 0.1379 0.1487 
Difference (G2  - G1) -  0.02277  0.0005  -0.0236  -0.0219 
“Net” difference in social 
immobility  - 0.01413  0.0003  -0.0147  -0.0136 
Difference due to difference in 
the margins of the social 
mobility matrix 
- 0.00864  0.0002  -0.0090  -0.0083 
Difference due to differences in 
the “professional composition” 
of the mothers 
- 0.00535  0.0001  -0.0056  -0.0051 
Difference due to differences in 
the income distribution of the 
children (daughters versus sons) 
- 0.00329  0.0001  -0.0034  -0.0032   20
TABLE 2. SOCIAL MOBILITY—RESULTS BASED ON THE ISRAELI DATA BASE 
 
A. Comparing the Degree of Social Immobility among Those Whose Father Was Born in 
Europe or America and Those Whose Father Was Born in Asia or Africa, Using the Gini 
Social Immobility Index 
 















Social immobility among those 
whose father born in Asia or Africa 
(G1) 
0.23276 0.0054 0.2239  0.2416 
Social immobility among those 
whose father was born in Europe or 
America (G2) 
0.12357 0.0028 0.1189  0.1282 
Difference (G2  - G1) -  0.10919  0.0025  -0.1133  -0.1050 
“Net” difference in social immobility  - 0.31028  0.0072  -0.3220  -0.2985 
Difference due to difference in the 
margins of the social mobility matrix  0.20109 0.0047 0.1934  0.2088 
Difference due to differences in the in 
the “educational composition” of the 
parents’ generation 
0.19625 0.0045 0.1889  0.2036 
Difference due to differences in the 
income distribution of the children’s 
generation 
0.00484 0.0001 0.0047  0.0050 
 
B. Comparing the Degree of Social Immobility among Those Whose Father Was Born in 
Asia or Africa and Those Whose Father Was Born in Israel, Using the Gini Social 
Immobility Index 
 















Social immobility among those whose 
father born in Asia or Africa (G1)  0.23276  0.0054 0.2239 0.2416 
Social immobility among those whose 
father was born in Israel (G2)  0.14696  0.0033 0.1415 0.1525 
Difference (G2  - G1) -  0.08580  0.0020  -0.0891  -0.0825 
“Net” difference in social immobility  - 0.16360  0.0038  -0.1699  -0.1573 
Difference due to difference in the 
margins of the social mobility matrix  0.07780  0.0018 0.0748 0.0808 
Difference due to differences in the in 
the “educational composition” of the 
parents’ generation 
0.07953  0.0018 0.0765 0.0825 
Difference due to differences in the 
income distribution of the children’s 
generation 
- 0.00173  0.0000  -0.0018  -0.0017   21
C. Comparing the Degree of Social Immobility among Those Whose Father Was Born in 
Europe or America and Those Whose Father Was Born in Israel, Using the Gini Social 
Immobility Index 
 















Social immobility among those 
whose father born in Europe or 
America (G1) 
0.12357  0.0029 0.1189 0.1283 
Social immobility among those 
whose father was born in Israel 
(G2) 
0.14696  0.0034 0.1414 0.1525 
Difference (G2  - G1)  0.02338  0.0005 0.0225 0.0243 
“Net” difference in social 
immobility  0.04875  0.0011 0.0469 0.0506 
Difference due to difference in 
the margins of the social 
mobility matrix 
- 0.02537  0.0006  -0.0263  -0.0244 
Difference due to differences in 
the in the “educational 
composition” of the parents’ 
generation 
- 0.02041  0.0005  -0.0212  -0.0196 
Difference due to differences in 
the income distribution of the 
children’s generation 
- 0.00496  0.0001  -0.0051  -0.0048 
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TABLE 3. MEASURING INEQUALITY IN CIRCUMSTANCES 
 
A. On the Basis of Data on the Social Mobility from Fathers to Daughters in France, 
Using the Theil Index 
 
Income Class 
Theil Index of 
Income Class 
and Overall 































































0.05963  0.0014  0.0573 0.0619 0.1312  0.00782  0.1178 
20,000FF or 




0.06642  0.0015 0.0639  0.0689    0.06642     23
 
B. On the Basis of Data on the Social Mobility from Fathers to Daughters in France, 
Using the Gini Index 
 
Income Class 
Gini Index of 
Income Class 
and Overall 
































































0.1848  0.0042  0.1779 0.1917 0.1312  0.00318  0.1320 
20,000FF or 




0.02411  0.0006 0.0232  0.0250    0.02411   
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C. On the Basis of Data on Social Mobility in Israel, among Those Whose Father was Born 




Gini Index of 
Income Class 
and Overall 






































or less  0.2112  0.0049  0.2032 0.2192 0.0435  0.00040  0.0177 
NIS 2,001 
to 3,000  0.1957  0.0045  0.1883 0.2031 0.0621  0.00075  0.0335 
NIS 3,001 
to 4,000  0.2758  0.0064  0.2652 0.2864 0.0932  0.00239  0.1062 
NIS 4,001 
to 5,000  0.3002  0.0070  0.2887 0.3117 0.0745  0.00167  0.0740 
NIS 5,001 
to 7,000  0.1231  0.0028  0.1184 0.1278 0.1677  0.00346  0.1536 
NIS 7,001 
to 9,000  0.2413  0.0056  0.2321 0.2505 0.1304  0.00411  0.1822 
NIS 9,001 

















0.02253  0.0005 0.0217  0.0234    0.02253   
   25
 
FIGURE 1. (Gross) Social Immobility Curve versus Curve of Inequality in Circumstances 
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FIGURE 2. Gross and Net Social Immobility Curves Israel: Fathers born in Europe or 
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APPENDIX A. The Theil Social Immobility Index and the Impact of Two “Margin-
Preserving” Transfers 
 
Assume first that (mfh/( mf. m.h))> (mfk/( mf. m.k)) and that (mlk/( ml. m.k))> (mlh/( ml. m.h)).  
Assume then that two “transfers” of size δ take place, one from mfh to mfk, and one from mlk to 
mlh. Since the combination of these two transfers implies that there was no change in the marginal 
shares, the change in the Theil index of immobility may be expressed as: 
 
∆Tim = ( mf. m.h){ln [( mf. m.h)/(mfh-δ)] – ln [( mf. m.h)/(mfh)]} 
+ ( mf. m.k){ln [( mf. m.k)/(mfk+δ)] – ln [( mf. m.k)/(mfk)]} 
+ ( ml. m.h){ln [( ml. m.h)/(mlh+δ)] – ln [( ml. m.h)/(mlh)]} 
+ ( ml. m.k){ln [( ml. m.k)/(mlk-δ)] – ln [( ml. m.k)/(mlk)]} 
↔ ∆Tim = ( mf. m.h)[ln (mfh) – ln (mfh-δ)] 
+ ( mf. m.k)[ln (mfk) – ln (mfk+δ)] 
+ ( ml. m.h)[ln (mlh) – ln (mlh+δ)] 
                                                  + ( ml. m.k)[ln (mlk) – ln (mlk-δ)]                                         (A-1) 
 
Let us now express ∆Tim in (A) as ∆T1 + ∆T2 with 
 
               ∆T1 = mf. {(m.h)[ln (mfh) – ln (mfh-δ)] + (m.k)[ln (mfk) – ln (mfk+δ)]}                (A-2) 
                ∆T2 = ml. {(m.h)[ln (mlh) – ln (mlh+δ)] + (m.k)[ln (mlk) – ln (mlk-δ)] }                (A-3) 
 
∆Tim in (A-1) will certainly be negative since the Theil index decreases when a “progressive 
transfer” is made. As a consequence, the two transfers previously mentioned will increase social 
mobility. 
  What does the condition that ∆Tim =  ∆T1 + ∆T2 < 0 imply? Using (A-2) and (A-3) we see 
that it implies that 
 
mf. {(m.h)[ln (mfh) – ln (mfh-δ)] + (m.k)[ln (mfk) – ln (mfk+δ)]} 
       +    ml. {(m.h)[ln (mlh) – ln (mlh+δ)] + (m.k)[ln (mlk) – ln (mlk-δ)] }   < 0             (A-4) 
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Let us now call ε1 the difference [ln (mfh) – ln (mfh-δ)] and ε2 the difference [ln (mfk+δ) – ln 
(mfk)]. 
  Similarly, let us call β1 the difference [ln (mlh+ δ) – ln (mlh)] and β2 the difference [ln (mlk) 
– ln (mlk- δ)]. 
  Condition (A-4) may then be expressed as 
 
                        mf. [m.h ε1 - m.k ε2 ] + ml. [- m.h β1 + m.k β2 ]   < 0                               (A-5) 
 
Two possibilities now arise. Either we assume that [m.h ε1 - m.k ε2 ] > 0 ↔ (m.h / m.k) > (ε2 /ε1), 
but then (A-5) amounts to assuming that ( mf. / ml. ) < [- m.h β1 + m.k β2 ] / [m.h ε1 - m.k ε2 ]. 
  But since, by definition, ( mf. / ml. ) > 0, this implies that we assume also that [- m.h β1 + 
m.k β2 ] > 0 ↔ (m.h / m.k) < (β2 /β1)              
  Both conditions then lead to  
 
                                    (ε2 /ε1) < (m.h / m.k) < (β2 /β1)                                           (A-6) 
 
The other possibility is that we assume that [m.h ε1 - m.k ε2 ] < 0  
↔ (m.h / m.k) < (ε2 /ε1) 
  In such a case, (A-5) amounts to assuming that ( mf. / ml. ) > [- m.h β1 + m.k β2 ] / [m.h ε1 - 
m.k ε2 ]  
  But since, by definition, ( mf. / ml. ) > 0, this implies that we assume also that [- m.h β1 + 
m.k β2 ] < 0 ↔ (m.h / m.k) > (β2 /β1)              
  Both conditions then lead to  
 
                          (β2 /β1) <  (m.h / m.k) < (ε2 /ε1)                                      (A-7) 
 
  Remember, however, that we defined ε1 as [ln (mfh) – ln (mfh-δ)] and ε2 as [ln (mfk+δ) – ln 
(mfk)]. But [ln (mfh) – ln (mfh-δ)] ≈ (δ/ mfh) and [ln (mfk+δ) – ln (mfk)] ≈ (δ/ mfk). 
Therefore (ε2 /ε1) ≈  ((δ/ mfk)/ (δ/ mfh) ) = (mfh)/( mfk). 
  Similarly, we defined β1 as [ln (mlh+ δ) – ln (mlh)] and β2 as [ln (mlk) – ln (mlk- δ)]. But [ln 
(mlh+ δ) – ln (mlh)] ≈ (δ/ mlh) and [ln (mlk) – ln (mlk- δ)] ≈ (δ/ mlk). Therefore (β2 /β1) ≈  ((δ/ mlk)/ 
(δ/ mlh) ) = (mlh)/( mlk)   29
  Condition (A-6) may therefore be rewritten as 
 
 
                     (mfh)/( mfk) < (m.h / m.k) < (mlh)/( mlk)                                           (A-8) 
 
and condition (A-7) as 
 
                       (mlh)/( mlk) <  (m.h / m.k) < (mfh)/( mfk)                                     (A-9) 
 
Let us now examine what the conditions implied by the two “progressive transfers” previously 
mentioned. 
  We first recall that we assumed previously that (mfh/( mf. m.h))> (mfk/( mf. m.k)), which is 
equivalent to assuming that  
 
                                        (mfh/mfk)> (m.h/m.k)                                              (A-10) 
 
We had also assumed that (mlk/( ml. m.k))> (mlh/( ml. m.h)),  which is equivalent to assuming that  
 
                                    (mlh/mlk)< (m.h/(m.k)                                                 (A-11) 
 
Combining (A-10) and (A-11) we conclude that the two simultaneous transfers imply that 
 
                                           (mlh/mlk)< (m.h/(m.k) < (mfh/mfk)                                      (A-12) 
 
Comparing (A-8) and (A-9) on one hand with (A-12) on the other, we conclude that only 
condition (A-9) [which is also condition (A-12 )]  is possible.  
  Let us now see whether we need to assume anything concerning the ordering of  
mlh, mlk ,m.h, m.k, mfh and mfk.    
 
Case 1: Assume that mfh > mfk and that mlh < mlk . 
  This means, as we saw previously, that (ε2/ε1) > 1 and (β2/β1) < 1. But, as stressed before,  
                           (ε2/ε1) > 1  ↔  (mfh)/( mfk) > 1                                     (A-13) 
and    30
                          (β2/β1) < 1  ↔  (mlh/mlk)< 1.                                         (A-14) 
 
Combining (A-12), (A-13), and (A-14) we conclude that Case 1 amounts to assuming either that  
 
                                   (mlh/mlk)< 1 < (m.h/(m.k) < (mfh/mfk)                                (A-15)  
or that 
 
             (mlh/mlk)< (m.h/(m.k) < 1 < (mfh/mfk)                               (A-16) 
 
Case 2: Assume that mfh > mfk and that   mlh > mlk . 
  This means, as we saw previously, that (ε2/ε1) > 1 and (β2/β1) > 1 and, as a consequence, 
that  
                                       (mfh)/( mfk) > 1   and   (mlh/mlk) > 1                            (A-17) 
 
Combining (A-12) and (A-17) we conclude now that Case 2 amounts to assuming that  
 
           1 < (mlh/mlk)< (m.h/(m.k) < (mfh/mfk)                            (A-18) 
 
Case 3: Assume that mfh < mfk and that mlh < mlk . 
 
This means, as we saw previously, that (ε2/ε1) < 1  and  (β2/β1) < 1 and, as a consequence, that  
 
         (mfh)/( mfk) < 1   and   (mlh/mlk) < 1                                (A-19) 
 
Combining (A-12) and (A-19) we conclude now that Case 3 amounts to assuming that  
 
     (mlh/mlk)< (m.h/(m.k) < (mfh/mfk)  < 1                               (A-20) 
 
Case 4: Assume that mfh < mfk and that   mlh > mlk . 
  This means, as we saw previously, that (ε2/ε1) < 1  and  (β2/β1) > 1 and, as a consequence, 
that  
 
(mfh)/( mfk) < 1   and   (mlh/mlk) > 1                                      (A-21)   31
 
However, since (A-12) implies that (mlh/mlk)< (m.h/(m.k) < (mfh/mfk), Case 4 is impossible. 
 
The three other cases therefore leave us with one of the following possibilities: 
 
  a )   ( m lh/mlk)< 1 < (m.h/(m.k) < (mfh/mfk)                                                              
  b )   ( m lh/mlk)< (m.h/(m.k) < 1 < (mfh/mfk)                                                            
  c )   1   < (mlh/mlk)< (m.h/(m.k) < (mfh/mfk)                                                             
  d )   ( m lh/mlk)< (m.h/(m.k) < (mfh/mfk)  < 1                                                (A-22)       
 
We may therefore conclude that the only assumption that needs to be made is that  
 
                    (mlh/mlk)< (m.h/(m.k) < (mfh/mfk)                                                 (A-23) 
 
But (A-23) implies that condition (A-9) will always hold and since condition (A-9) implies that 
∆Tim < 0, we may safely conclude that the sum of two “margin-preserving“ transfers will always 
lead to a decrease in the value of the Theil immobility index.  
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APPENDIX B. On the Concept of Shapley Decomposition 
 
The concept of Shapley decomposition is a technique borrowed from game theory but extended 
to applied economics by Shorrocks (1999) and Sastre and Trannoy (2002).  
  Assume an indicator (I) is a function of three determinants a,b,c and is written as 
I= I(a,b,c). I could be an index of inequality, but, more generally, any function of variables, this 
function being linear or not. 
  There are obviously 3!=6 ways of ordering these three determinants a, b, and c: 
(a,b,c),(a,c,b),(b,a,c),(b,c,a),(c,a,b),(c,b,a) 
  The idea of the Shapley decomposition is to compute the marginal contribution of each 
of the three determinants a,b,c.  
  Let us take the case of a. The marginal contribution C(a) of a is computed by comparing 
the value of I when a≠0 and its value when a=0. However, in each of these two cases (a≠0 and 
a=o), the other determinants (b and c) may themselves be different from 0 or equal to. Hence, the 
importance of taking into account all the possible orderings of a, b, and c. 
  All the following cases therefore have to be taken into account when computing the 
marginal contribution of determinant a: 
 
1)  I(a≠0;b≠0;c≠0) – I(a=0;b≠0;c≠0)  
2)  I(a≠0;b≠0;c≠0) – I(a=0;b≠0;c≠0)  
3)  I(a≠0;b=0;c≠0) – I(a=0;b=0;c≠0) 
4)  I(a≠0;b≠0;c=0) – I(a=0;b≠0;c=0)  
5)  I(a≠0;b=0;c=0) – I(a=0;b=0;c=0)  
6)  I(a≠0;b=0;c=0) – I(a=0;b=0;c=0) 
 
It is then easy to conclude that 
 
C(a) = (2/6)[I(a≠0;b≠0;c≠0) – I(a=0;b≠0;c≠0)] 
        + (1/6)[I(a≠0;b=0;c≠0) – I(a=0;b=0;c≠0)] 
        + (1/6)[I(a≠0;b≠0;c=0) – I(a=0;b≠0;c=0)] 
        + (2/6)[I(a≠0;b=0;c=0) – I(a=0;b=0;c=0)] 
 
One can similarly compute the marginal contributions C(b) and C(c).   33
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APPENDIX C. Decomposing Variations over Time in the Extent of Social Mobility 
 
In the previous section we have shown how the “move” from the matrix {mij} to the matrix {vij} 
really included two stages: one in which the margins were changed and one in which the internal 
structure of the matrix was modified. Let ∆SM = SM(v) – SM(m) refer to the overall variation in 
the extent of social mobility. ∆SM may also be expressed as ∆SM = f(∆m, ∆is), where ∆m and 
∆is refer, respectively, to the variation in the margins of the matrix and in its internal structure. 
Using Shapley’s decomposition (see Shorrocks 1999; Sastre and Trannoy 2002) the contribution 
C∆ma of a change in the margins to the overall variation ∆SM may be written as: 
 
             C∆m  = (1/2) f(∆ma) + (1/2) [f(∆ma, ∆is) - f(∆is)]                                 (C-1) 
 
Similarly, the contribution C∆is of the change in the internal structure of the matrix to the overall 
variation ∆SM will be expressed as: 
 
                      C∆is  = (1/2) f(∆is) + (1/2) [f(∆ma, ∆is) - f(∆ma)]                                   (C-2) 
 
It is easy to observe that C∆ma  + C∆is  = ∆SM  
  Using the definitions of the matrices {sij}and {wij}given in Section 2.B.1, we derive that 
the contributions C∆ma  and C∆is may be also written as 
 
C∆ma=(1/2)[SM(s)–SM(m)]+(1/2){[SM(v) – SM(m)]–[SM(w) – SM(m)]}               (C-3) 
 
⇔ C∆ma  = (1/2) {[SM(s) – SM(m)] + [SM(v) – SM(w)]}                                         (C-4) 
 
C∆is=(1/2)[SM(w)–SM(m)]+(1/2){[SM(v)–SM(m)]–[SM(s)– SM(m)]}                  (C-5) 
 
⇔ C∆is=(1/2){[SM(w) – SM(m)] + [SM(v) – SM(s)]}                                             (C-6) 
 
  Applying the idea of a Nested Shapley decomposition (see Sastre and Trannoy 2002), we 
can now further decompose the contribution C∆ma . In Section 2.B.1 we had defined the matrix 
{rij} as that which is obtained by multiplying the cells (i,j) of {mij} by the ratios (vi./mi.) where vi. 
and mi. are, respectively, the horizontal margins of the matrices {mij}and {vij}. Let us now call   35
{nij} a matrix which is obtained by multiplying the cells (i,j) of {mij} by the ratios (v.j/m.j) where 
v.j and m.j are, respectively, the vertical margins of the matrices {mij}and {vij}. Using again the 
idea of Shapley decomposition applied this time to the difference Dma1 defined as 
 
                               Dma1 = [SM(s) – SM(m)]                                                     (C-7) 
 
we may write that 
 
                                      Dma1 = g(∆h, ∆t)                                                          (C-8) 
 
where ∆h and ∆t refer, respectively, to the changes in the horizontal and vertical margins. The 
contributions C∆h1 and C∆t1 to the difference Dma1 may be then defined as 
 
        C∆h1 = (1/2) g(∆h) + (1/2){[g(∆h, ∆t)] – g(∆t)}                                      (C-9) 
 
          C∆t1 = (1/2) g(∆t) + (1/2){[g(∆h, ∆t)] – g(∆h)}                                      (C-10) 
 
Using the definitions of {rij}and {nij} given previously, these contributions C∆h1 and C∆t1 may be 
also expressed as 
 
C∆h1 = (1/2) [SM(r) - SM(m)] + (1/2){[SM(s) – SM(m)] – [SM(n) – SM(m)]}                                  
 




C∆t1=(1/2)[SM(n)-SM(m)]+(1/2){[SM(s)–SM(m)]–[SM(r)–SM(m)]}                      (C-12) 
 
⇔C∆t1=(1/2){[SM(n)-SM(m)]+ [SM(s) – SM(r)]}                                                    (C-13) 
 
Let us now decompose in a similar way the difference Dma2 defined as  
 
                Dma2 = [SM(v)– SM(w)]                                                             (C-14)   36
  We now define two additional matrices, {cij} and {fij}, defined as follows. The elements 
cij of the matrix {cij} are obtained by multiplying the elements vij of the matrix {vij} by the ratios 
(wi./vi.), where wi. and vi. refer to the horizontal margins of the matrices {wij} and {vij}. Similarly, 
the elements fij of the matrix {fij} are obtained by multiplying the elements vij of the matrix {vij} 
by the ratios (w.j/v.j) where w.j and v.j refer to the vertical margins of the matrices {wij}and {vij}. 
We may therefore define the contributions C∆h2 and C∆t2  to the difference Dma2 as 
 
C∆h2=(1/2)[SM(v)-SM(c)]+(1/2){[SM(v)–SM(w)]–[SM(v)–SM(f)]}                         (C-15) 
 




C∆t2=(1/2)[SM(v)-SM(f)]+(1/2){[SM(v)–SM(w)]–[SM(v)–SM(c)]}                         (C-17)    
 
⇔C∆t2=(1/2){[SM(v)-SM(f)]+[SM(c)– SM(w)]}                                                       (C-18) 
 
Combining now (C-4), (C-7), (C-11), (C-13), (C-14), (C-16), and (C-18) we conclude that the 
contribution C∆ma may be written as 
 





    
Ct = (1/4){[(SM(n)-SM(m))+(SM(s)–SM(r))]+[(SM(v)-SM(f))+(SM(c)–SM(w))]} (C-21)                                   
 
Combining (C-20) and (C-21) we observe that, as expected, 
 
 Ch+Ct=(1/2){[(SM(s)–SM(m)]+[SM(v)–P(w)]} = C∆ma                                         (C-22) 
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APPENDIX D. The Bootstrap Principle [based on Bradley and Tibshirani (1993)].  
 
The problem solved by bootstrapping can be formulated as follows. We have a random sample X 
= (x1,…..xn), obtained from an unknown probability distribution A and we want to estimate a 
parameter (e.g., the index) θ= t(A) on the basis of X.  
  We calculate an estimation of  ) ( ˆ X s = θ using X; then the problem is to know how accurate 
this estimate is. Bootstrapping technique is based on resampling with replacement.  
  Each bootstrap sample X* is an independent random sample of size n from the empirical 
distribution followed by X (that we call Â). To each bootstrap sample corresponds a bootstrap 
estimation of θ ˆ:  ) ( ˆ * * X s = θ  that is the results of applying to X* the same function s( ) which has 
been applied to X. The bootstrap algorithm for estimating the standard error and the confidence 
intervals can be summarised by the following steps: 
 
1)  Select B independent bootstrap samples X1
*, X2
*, …., XB
*, each consisting of n data 
values drawn with replacement from X (a good rule of thumb is B = 1000). 
2)  Evaluate the bootstrap replication corresponding to each bootstrap sample 
) ( ) ( ˆ * *
b X s b = θ  with   b=1, 2, …, B 


























B B B b b e s θ θ  
and the confidence intervals as: [ ] B B e s z e s z ˆ ˆ    ; ˆ ˆ ) ( ) 1 ( α α θ θ + −
−  where z
α  is the α
th percentile of the 




   38
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
Bradley, E, and J. Tibshirani. 1993. An Introduction to the Bootstrap. New York: Chapman and 
Hall. 
 
Chantreuil, F., and A. Trannoy. 1999. “Inequality Decomposition Values: The Trade-Off between 
Marginality and Consistency.” THEMA Discussion Paper, Université de Cergy-Pontoise. 
 
Corak, M., B. Gustafsson, and T. Österberg. 2004. Generational Income Mobility in North 
America and Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Deming, W. E., and F. F. Stephan. 1940. “On a Least Squares Adjustment of a Sampled 
Frequency Table when the Expected Marginals are Known.” Annals of Mathematical 
Statistics 11(4): 427–444. 
 
Deutsch. J., Y. Flückiger, and J. Silber. 2006. “The Concept of Shapley Decomposition and the 
Study of Occupational Segregation.” mimeo. 
 
Flückiger, Y., and J. Silber. 1994. “The Gini Index and the Measurement of Multidimensional 
Inequality.” Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics 56(2): 225–228. 
 
Karmel, T., and M. MacLachlan. 1988. “Occupational Sex Segregation—Increasing or 
Decreasing.” Economic Record 64(186): 187–195. 
 
Kolm, S.-C. 2001. “To Each According to her Work? Just Entitlement from Action: Desert, 
Merit, Responsibility, and Equal Opportunities. A Review of John Roemer’s Equality of 
Opportunity.” mimeo. 
 
Lefranc, A., N. Pistolesi, and A. Trannoy. 2006. “Equality of Opportunity: Definitions and 
Testable Conditions, with an Application to Income in France.” ECINEQ Working Paper 
2006–53. 
 
Peragine, V. 2004. “Ranking Income Distributions According to Equality of Opportunity.” 
Journal of Economic Inequality 2(1): 11–30. 
 
Piketty, T. 1999. “Attitudes toward Inequality in France: Do People Really Disagree?” 
CEPREMAP Working Paper, No. 9918. 
 
Roemer, J. E. 1998. Equality of Opportunity. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
 
Ruiz-Castillo, J. 2003. “The Measurement of Inequality of Opportunities.” Research in Economic 
Inequality 9: 1–34. 
 
Sastre, M., and A. Trannoy. 2002. “Shapley Inequality Decomposition by Factor Components: 
Some Methodological Issues.” Journal of Economics Supplement 9: 51–89. 
 
Shorrocks, A. F. 1999. “Decomposition Procedures for Distributional Analysis: A Unified 
Framework Based on the Shapley Value.” mimeo, University of Essex. 
   39
Silber, J. 1989a. “On the Measurement of Employment Segregation.” Economic Letters 30(3): 
237–243. 
 
————. 1989b. “Factors Components, Population Subgroups, and the Computation of the Gini 
Index of Inequality.” The Review of Economics and Statistics LXXI: 107–115. 
 
Solon, G. 1999. “Intergenerational Mobility in the Labor Market.” in O. Ashenfelter and D. Card 
(eds.) Handbook in Labor Economics, Volume 3A. Amsterdam: North Holland. 
 
Theil, H. 1967. Economics and Information Theory. Amsterdam: North Holland. 
 
Van de gaer, D., E. Schokkaert, and M. Martinez. 2001. “Three Meanings of Intergenerational 
Mobility.” Economica 68(272): 519–37. 
 
Villar, A. 2005. “On the Welfare Evaluation of Income and Opportunity.” Contributions to 
Theoretical Economics 5(1): 1–19. 